

Direct Decentralization:
Ballot Measures as a Centralization Foil
Supplemental Online Appendices

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APPENDIX A

DIRECT DECENTRALIZATION CODEBOOK

URL with ballot measure descriptions:

<http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/ballot-measures-database.aspx>

Code: Scope

Trichotomous code that takes the values of (1,2,3).

Coded 1 if the ballot measure affects only a single unit most commonly a single city or county. However this does occasionally contain other unities such as a, Native American tribes, schools, prisons, rivers, etc. This is more common with older (pre 1950) ballot measures. Coded 2 if the ballot measure affects more than one unit but less than all units statewide. Again, most commonly a collection of cities or counties within a state. Coded 3 if the ballot measure applies statewide to all affected units. (3 will be the most common code).

Examples of Scope 1:

Referendum Petition to Overturn Amendment to Indian Gaming Compact. Proposition 94

Election: Primary - 2008

Type: Popular Referendum

Status: Pass (Yes votes: 55.6%)

Topic Areas: Gambling & Lotteries | State-Tribal Relations

Summary: [Click for Summary](#).

To be considered in the presidential primary on February 5, 2008.

Would repeal a law that ratifies an amendment to an existing gaming compact between the state and Pechanga Band of Luiseño Mission Indians; exempts certain projects from the California Environmental Quality Act; requires that revenue paid by tribe be deposited in the General Fund.

**Authorizing Amendments to Miami-Dade County Home Rule Charter by
Special Law Approved by Referendum** Constitutional Amendment 3

Election: General - 2002

Type: Legislative Referendum

Status: Fail (Yes votes: 47.6%)

Topic Areas: Civil & Constitutional Law | Local Government

Summary: [Click for Summary](#).

Proposing an amendment to Section 6 of Article VIII of the State Constitution to authorize amendments or revisions to the Miami-Dade County Home Rule Charter by special law approved by a vote of the electors of Miami-Dade County and to conform references to the county's current name.

Bill Prohibiting Commercial Fishing on the Rogue River

Measure 5

Election: General - 1932**Type:** Popular Referendum**Status:** **Fail** (Yes votes: 41.4%)**Topic Areas:** Animal Rights/Hunting & Fishing | Business & Commerce | Natural Resources**Summary:** [Click for Summary.](#)

Not available.

Examples of Scope 2:**Creating Clark County From Part of Grant**

Measure 18

Election: General - 1910**Type:** Initiative**Status:** **Fail** (Yes votes: 20.2%)**Topic Areas:** Local Government**Summary:** [Click for Summary.](#)

[S]

Permits gambling boats in moats on the Mississippi and Missouri RiversConstitutional **Amendment 9****Election:** General - 1998**Type:** Initiative**Status:** **Pass** (Yes votes: 55.5%)**Topic Areas:** Gambling & Lotteries**Summary:** [Click for Summary.](#)

If adopted, Constitutional **Amendment 9** would authorize the General Assembly to permit riverboat casinos to operate lotteries, gift enterprises, and games of chance in artificial spaces that contain water and are within 1,000 feet of the closest edge of the main channel of either the Mississippi or Missouri Rivers. This amendment would apply to boats currently licensed and those that might be licensed in the future. This amendment was proposed after a Missouri Supreme Court decision ruled that the Constitution does not currently allow gaming facilities to operate lotteries, gift enterprises and games of chance unless they are located along the main channels of the rivers.

[CA]

County health departments - allowing additional levy in counties with more than 500,000 personsState Question **685****Election:** General - 2000**Type:** Legislative Referendum**Status:** **Fail** (Yes votes: 35.6%)**Topic Areas:** Health | Local Government | Tax & Revenue**Summary:** [Click for Summary.](#)

Legislative Constitutional Amendment

This measure amends the State Constitution. It will allow a county to increase property taxes by up to two and one-half mills to support county health departments. The new tax will only be allowed in counties with more than 500,000 persons. The new tax must be approved by county voters.

Examples of Scope 3:

English is the Official Language of Florida

Constitutional Amendment

11

Election: General - 1988

Type: Initiative

Status: **Pass** (Yes votes: 84.0%)

Topic Areas: Civil & Constitutional Law | State Government

Summary: [Click for Summary](#).

Establishes English as the official language of the State of Florida. Enables the legislature to implement this article by appropriate legislation.

Florida Marriage Protection Amendment

Amendment 2

Election: General - 2008

Type: Initiative

Status: **Pass** (Yes votes: 61.9%)

Topic Areas: Civil & Constitutional Law

Summary: [Click for Summary](#).

This amendment protects marriage as the legal union of only one man and one woman as husband and wife and provides that no other legal union that is treated as marriage or the substantial equivalent thereof shall be valid or recognized.

Increased Homestead Exemption

Constitutional Amendment

6

Election: General - 2006

Type: Legislative Referendum

Status: **Pass** (Yes votes: 76.4%)

Topic Areas: Tax & Revenue

Summary: [Click for Summary](#).

Proposing amendment of the State Constitution to increase the maximum additional homestead exemption for low-income seniors from \$25,000 to \$50,000 and to schedule the amendment to take effect January 1, 2007, if adopted.

Code: Substance

A five-point scale. Ballot measures will be coded between values of -2 through +2. Negative values indicate that a ballot measure decentralizes power. Power is devolved from the state to either local level governance or enshrined in the constitution to the citizen level of governance. This can also occur if municipal governance is devolved to citizen level governance (e.g. requiring citizens to approve municipal bonds when previously a city council could issue on their own). Positive values indicate that a ballot measure centralizes power. In the vertical case, this means that power is centralized from citizen or local level to the state level, or citizen level to local level. The neutral value, 0, indicates a measure which either does not impact centralization within a state or contains elements of both devolution and centralization.

The values 1 and 2 indicate the extent of devolution or centralization. A score of 2 was assigned if a proposal fully decentralized or centralized a policy away (towards) state government. A score of -1 was assigned if a proposal only partially decentralized (centralized) power away (towards) state government. The difference between partial versus full decentralization (centralization) depends upon how much power is reserved for state-level actors. If a ballot measure places decision making wholly in the hands of either voters or local-level governance, then the ballot measure is considered fully decentralized. Conversely, if the ballot measure places decision making only in the hands of state-level actors then a ballot measure is coded as fully centralizing. If decision making is split between state-level and/or local-level citizen-level actors the ballot measure is deemed partially decentralizing (centralizing).

Examples of code 2:

Institutions for Felons

Proposition 3

Election: General - 1940

Type: Legislative Referendum

Status: **Pass** (Yes votes: 50.1%)

Topic Areas: Criminal Justice

Summary: [Click for Summary](#)

Amends Constitution, Article X, section 7. Declares Legislature may provide for establishment, government and superintendence of all institutions for persons convicted of felonies, and for that purpose may delegate the government and superintendence of such institutions to any public governmental agency, officer or board; and may provide for punishment, treatment and custody of females differently from men similarly convicted. Until Legislature otherwise provides declares effective existing statutes and constitutional provisions purporting to cover such matters.

Disabled Veterans Tax Exemption

Proposition 12

Election: General - 1972

Type: Legislative Referendum

Status: **Pass** (Yes votes: 89.7%)

Topic Areas: Military & Veterans Affairs | Tax & Revenue

Summary: [Click for Summary](#)

Permits Legislature to extend disabled veterans tax exemption to totally disabled persons suffering service-connected loss of both arms, loss of arm and leg, or blindness in both eyes and loss of either arm or leg. Extends exemption to either surviving spouse. Financial impact: Nominal decrease in local government revenues.

County Officials' Compensation

LRCA-3P-1986

Election: Primary - 1986

Type: Legislative Referendum

Status: **Pass** (Yes votes: 69.6%)

Topic Areas: Labor & Employment | Local Government

Summary: [Click for Summary](#)

Considered on August 5, 1986.

County officials' compensation shall not exceed limits provided by law or as established by the proper authority.

Examples of code 1:

Limitations on Enforcement of Unfair Business Competition Laws. Initiative Statute.

Proposition 64

Election: General - 2004

Type: Initiative

Status: **Pass** (Yes votes: 59.0%)

Topic Areas: Business & Commerce | Civil & Constitutional Law

Summary: [Click for Summary](#)

- Limits individual's right to sue by allowing private enforcement of unfair business competition laws only if that individual was actually injured by, and suffered financial/property loss because of, an unfair business practice.
- Requires private representative claims to comply with procedural requirements applicable to class action lawsuits.
- Authorizes only the California Attorney General or local government prosecutors to sue on behalf of general public to enforce unfair business competition laws.
- Limits use of monetary penalties recovered by Attorney General or local government prosecutors to enforcement of consumer protection laws.

Allow the investment of state money in a company, association, or corporation to assist economic development and the creation of new high-quality jobs

Question 1

Election: General - 2000

Type: Legislative Referendum

Status: **Fail** (Yes votes: 41%)

Topic Areas: Business & Commerce | Economic Development

Summary: [Click for Summary](#)

Legislative Constitutional Amendment

The Nevada Constitution currently prohibits the State from investing its money in any company, association, or corporation, except for corporations formed for educational or charitable purposes. The proposed amendment would enable the Legislature to authorize the prudently managed investment of State money subject to the following conditions:

1. That the investment is for the economic diversification or development of Nevada or for the creation of new high-quality employment opportunities in Nevada;
2. That the State can expect a reasonable rate of return on the investment, adjusted for the relative degree of risk;
3. That any legislation authorizing such an investment must be approved by a two-thirds vote of each house of the Nevada Legislature and also by the Governor;
4. That the state's participation must be made in cooperation with knowledgeable private investors on terms that are the same as or more favorable than those of the private investors; and
5. That revenue received from these investments may be reinvested under the same conditions.

Examples of code 0:

Calling For Mutual, Verifiable Nuclear Weapons Freeze Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Proposal E

Election: General - 1982

Type: Initiative

Status: **Pass** (Yes votes: 57.0%)

Topic Areas: Federal Government

Summary: [Click for Summary](#)

New legislation calling for mutual, verifiable nuclear weapons freeze between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and requiring transmission of communication to United States government officials.

Relocating and Constructing a New Capital

Initiative No. 3

Election: Primary - 1974

Type: Initiative

Status: **Pass** (Yes votes: 56.7%)

Topic Areas: State Government

Summary: [Click for Summary](#)

This initiative bill calls for construction of a new Alaskan capital city at one of two or three sites nominated by a selection committee appointed by the Governor. Each site must include at least 100 square miles of donated and public land, in Western Alaska at least thirty miles from Anchorage and Fairbanks. The final selection will be made, after a committee report and hearings, by plurality vote in a general election. Construction must allow movement of offices to begin by October 1, 1980. Funding for committee activity and construction of capital facilities is to be provided by the Legislature.

Casinos and Gambling

Proposition A

Election: General - 2008

Type: Initiative

Status: **Pass** (Yes votes: 56.2%)

Topic Areas: Education: PreK-12 | Gambling & Lotteries

Summary: [Click for Summary](#)

Shall Missouri law be amended to:

- repeal the current individual maximum loss limit for gambling;
- prohibit any future loss limits;
- require identification to enter the gambling area only if necessary to establish that an individual is at least 21 years old;
- restrict the number of casinos to those already built or being built;
- increase the casino gambling tax from 20% to 21%;
- create a new specific education fund from gambling tax proceeds generated as a result of this measure called the "Schools First Elementary and Secondary Education Improvement Fund;" and
- require annual audits of this new fund?

State governmental entities will receive an estimated \$105.1 to \$130.0 million annually for elementary and secondary education, and \$5.0 to \$7.0 million annually for higher education, early childhood development, veterans, and other programs. Local governmental entities receiving gambling boat tax and fee revenues will receive an estimated \$18.1 to \$19.0 million annually.

Examples of code -1:

Exempting Educational Institutions from Taxation
Proposition 4

Election: Special - 1933

Type: Legislative Referendum

Status: **Fail** (Yes votes: 40.2%)

Topic Areas: Education: PreK-12 | Tax & Revenue

Summary: [Click for Summary](#)

Amends Section 1a of Article XIII. Exempts from taxation the buildings and equipment of any educational institution not conducted for profit, and its securities and income used exclusively for educational purposes; if such institution be of collegiate grade, also exempts its grounds within which its buildings are located, not exceeding one hundred acres in area. If such institution be a private institution of less than collegiate grade, the exemption of such grounds is limited to ten acres.

Standards for Legislature to Follow in Legislative Redistricting
Amendment 5

Election: General - 2010

Type: Initiative

Status: **Pass** (Yes votes: 62.6%)

Topic Areas: Redistricting

Summary: [Click for Summary](#)

Legislative districts or districting plans may not be drawn to favor or disfavor an incumbent or political party. Districts shall not be drawn to deny racial or language minorities the equal opportunity to participate in the political process and elect representatives of their choice. Districts must be contiguous. Unless otherwise required, districts must be compact, as equal in population as feasible, and where feasible must make use of existing city, county and geographical boundaries.

Examples of code -2:

Congressional term limits
I-132

Election: General - 1996

Type: Initiative

Status: **Fail** (Yes votes: 45.4%)

Topic Areas: Federal Government | Term Limits

Summary: [Click for Summary](#)

This initiative would declare the policy of the voters of Montana to pass an amendment to the U.S. Constitution imposing term limits on members of Congress. Legislative and Congressional candidates could take a pledge to support a term limits constitutional amendment. Any candidate for congressional or state legislative office who fails to support such a term limits amendment would have the words "Disregarded Montana Voters on Term Limits" printed next to that candidate's name on the ballot. A challenge could be brought in the Montana Supreme Court to require that language to be added or removed from the ballot.

Require Supermajority Vote to Increase Taxes
Question 11

Election: General - 1994

Type: Initiative

Status: **Pass** (Yes votes: 78.1%)

Topic Areas: Legislatures | Tax & Revenue

Summary: [Click for Summary](#)

A two thirds majority vote of both houses of the legislature would be required for the passage of any bill or joint resolution which would increase public revenue in any form. The legislature could, by a simple majority vote, refer any such proposal to a vote of the people at the next general election.

Table A.1: Ballot Measure Years Used to Evaluate Intercoder Reliability

State	Year(s)
Alaska	1974 1978 2002
Arizona	1968 1992 2006
Arkansas	2004
California	1933 1940 1950 1952 1954 1960 1978 1990 2002 2010
Colorado	1922 1934 1944 1960

Table A.1: Continued

State	Year(s)
Florida	1992 2010
Idaho	1924
Maine	1935 1979 1998
Maryland	2012
Massachusetts	1938 1979 1998
Michigan	1932 1982
Missouri	1986 2008 2014
Montana	1978 1992 1996
Nebraska	1914 2000
Nevada	1980 1992 1994 2000
North Dakota	1920 1936
Ohio	1955 1959 1975 2004
Oklahoma	1944 1967 1988 1990
Oregon	1912 1934 1970 2008
South Dakota	1916 1980
Utah	2002 2008
Washington	1972 1976 1984 2001

Table A2. Intercoder Agreement - Scope

	Coef.	S.E.	t	[95% Conf. Interval]
Percent Agreement	0.9864	0.0157	62.72	0.9555 1
Brennan and Prediger	0.9819	0.0168	58.56	0.9489 1
Cohen/Conger's Kappa	0.8773	0.0616	14.25	0.7562 0.9985
Scott/Fleiss' Pi	0.8765	0.0624	14.05	0.7538 0.9993
Gwet's AC	0.9859	0.0158	62.22	0.9547 1
Krippendorff's Alpha	0.8773	0.0607	14.45	0.7578 0.9968

Table A3. Intercoder Agreement - Substance

	Coef.	S.E.	t	[95% Conf. Interval]
Percent Agreement	0.9521	0.0121	78.73	0.9283 0.9759
Brennan and Prediger	0.9401	0.0151	62.19	0.9104 0.9698
Cohen/Conger's Kappa	0.9385	0.0155	60.51	0.908 0.969
Scott/Fleiss' Pi	0.9385	0.0155	60.51	0.908 0.969
Gwet's AC	0.9405	0.015	62.6	0.9109 0.97
Krippendorff's Alpha	0.9386	0.0155	60.52	0.9081 0.9691

APPENDIX B

EMPIRICAL MODEL RESULTS AND EXTENSIONS

B.1: Probability of Ballot Measure Passage

	Popular b/se	Predicted Probability	Legislative b/se	Predicted Probability
<i>DV: Ballot measure passed</i>				
Centralization	-0.064** (0.016)	-0.013	-0.059** (0.016)	-0.013
State fixed effects	✓		✓	
Year fixed effects	✓		✓	
Constant	0.841* (0.359)		2.218* (0.856)	
N. of observations	1899		1720	
AIC	2252.548		1845.496	
BIC	2391.275		1981.748	

Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

B.2: Percent Supporting Ballot Measure Passage

	Popular b/se	Legislative b/se
<i>DV: Pct. in favor of ballot measure</i>		
Centralization	-0.566** (0.103)	-0.441** (0.106)
State fixed effects	✓	✓
Year fixed effects	✓	✓
Constant	67.455** (10.443)	98.784** (3.271)
N. of observations	1873	1668
AIC	15201.623	13639.530
BIC	15655.518	14078.500

Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

One consideration is that frequency of ballot measures within a state might influence the success of centralizing measures. Perhaps there is something unique to states that frequently use ballot measures that increases the success of decentralizing proposals (for discussion, see Seabrook, Dyck, and Lashcer 2015). In the direct democracy literature, there are three measures used to assess frequency of ballot measures use within states. First, the total number of ballot measures voted on citizens. Second, the mean annual number of ballot measures voted on each year within a state. Third, Bowler and Donovan's (2004) qualification index for ballot measures. This index accounts for the number of barriers that citizen's face in order to qualify a ballot measure for a vote – with higher values indicating criteria that are more restrictive.

As none of the three measures vary within a state-year, I cannot include them in an empirical model with year fixed effects. Therefore, I replicate the models presented in Tables B1 and B2 below with each of the frequency variables. Table B1 (dependent variable: binary indicator if a ballot measure passed) is replicated in B3 and Table B2 (dependent variable: the percent of a state voting in favor of a ballot measure's passage) is replicated in B4. State fixed effects are used in all models. Standard errors are clustered by year. Additionally, the qualification index variable was constructed in the early 2000s. States do occasionally change the criteria for ballot measure qualification. As archival records on ballot measure criteria is difficult to ascertain – I restrict models that estimate the variable to measures on the ballot in the year 2000 or later.

The results of the replications are consistent with findings presented in the main body of the paper. Centralization is negatively associated with ballot measure success – for both citizen and legislative proposed measures – across both dependent variables. I find constant associations between frequency of use and ballot measure success within my data.

B.3: Probability of Ballot Measure Passage – Alternative Measures

	IV: Total Number of Ballot Measures		IV: Mean Number of Ballot Measures		IV: Ballot Measure Qualification Index	
	Popular b/se	Legislative b/se	Popular b/se	Legislative b/se	Popular b/se	Legislative b/se
<i>DV: Ballot Measure Passed</i>						
Centralization	-0.056** (0.012)	-0.055** (0.020)	-0.056** (0.012)	-0.055** (0.020)	-0.081** (0.024)	-0.159** (0.038)
Total N. of Ballot Measures	0.002 (0.008)	0.005 (0.004)				
Mean N. of Ballot Measures			0.064 (0.309)	0.200 (0.172)		
Ballot Measure Qualification Index					-0.274 (0.346)	2.213 (1.492)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	-0.500 (1.576)	0.501 (0.596)	-0.635 (2.221)	0.080 (0.920)	0.733 (1.314)	-12.114 (8.506)
N. of observations	1899	1720	1899	1720	610	392
AIC	2546.754	2168.544	2546.754	2168.544	796.249	436.535
BIC	2691.057	2310.322	2691.057	2310.322	831.556	468.305

Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Two tailed confidence intervals. Robust standard errors clustered by year in parentheses.

B.4: Probability of Ballot Measure Passage – Alternative Measures

	IV: Total Number of Ballot Measures		IV: Mean Number of Ballot Measures		IV: Ballot Measure Qualification Index	
	Popular b/se	Legislative b/se	Popular b/se	Legislative b/se	Popular b/se	Legislative b/se
<i>DV: Pct. in favor of ballot measure</i>						
Centralization	-0.509** (0.090)	-0.474** (0.153)	-0.509** (0.090)	-0.474** (0.153)	-0.620* (0.187)	-1.051** (0.234)
Total N. of Ballot Measures	-0.108 (0.083)	-0.002 (0.024)				
Mean N. of Ballot Measures			-4.206 (3.239)	-0.066 (0.926)		
Ballot Measure Qualification Index					-1.668 (1.743)	21.677** (4.480)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	70.905** (16.829)	64.820** (3.345)	79.755** (23.621)	64.960** (4.972)	55.096** (6.526)	-64.648* (23.779)
N. of observations	1873	1668	1873	1668	607	392
AIC	15251.615	13698.345	15251.615	13698.345	4834.082	3288.723
BIC	15395.533	13839.249	15395.533	13839.249	4869.350	3320.891

Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Two tailed confidence intervals. Robust standard errors clustered by year in parentheses.

APPENDIX C

VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS, SUMMARY STATISTICS, AND FULL MODELS

Table C.1: PPIC variables – descriptions

Variable	Description
Dependent Variable	
Support	A dichotomous variable. Coded one if a respondent indicates that they are supportive of a proposed ballot measure. Coded 0 if the respondent indicates that they do not support a proposed ballot measure. Non-responses are dropped from analysis.
Independent Variables	
Respondent Trust	A trichotomous variable. Coded 1 if the respondent “always trusts the government in Sacramento to do what is right.” Coded 2 if the respondent “sometimes trusts the government in Sacramento to do what is right.” Coded 3 if the respondent “never trust the government in Sacramento to do what is right.” Sometimes trusting respondents are used as the reference category for the analysis. Non-responses are dropped from analysis.
Ballot Measure Substance	A trichotomous variable. Coded 1 if the ballot measure is decentralizing (a substance score of either -2 or -1). Coded 2 if the ballot measure is mixed or neutral in scope (a substance score of 0). Coded 3 if the ballot measure is centralizing in scope (a substance score of +1 or +2). Neutral/mixed ballot measures are used as the reference category in the analysis.
Control Variables	
Female	A dichotomous variable. Coded one if a respondent is female and zero if the respondent is male.
Age	A measure of a respondents self-identified age at the time of the survey.
Age-squared	The age variable squared. Not included in the PPIC data, constructed for this analysis.
Family income	A categorical variable. Coded 1 if family income is under \$20,000 for the prior fiscal year (also the reference category). Coded 2 if family income is between 20,000-40,000 dollars. Coded 3 if family income is between 40,000-60,000 dollars. Coded 4 if family income is between 60,000-80,000 dollars. Coded 5, if family income is between 80,000-100,000 dollars. Coded 6 if family income is between 100,000-200,000 dollars. Coded 7 if family income is \$200,000 or more.
Race	A nominal variable. Coded 4 if respondent identifies as non-Hispanic white (the reference category). Coded 1 if respondent is Asian. Coded 2 if the respondent is Black or African American, Coded 3 if respondent is Hispanic or Latino (any ethnicity). Coded 5 if the respondent volunteers some other racial identification.
Education	A categorical variable. Coded 1 if the respondent did not complete high school (also the reference category). Coded 2 if the respondent has a high school diploma or GED. Coded 3 if the respondent has some college education or Associate’s/Vocational degree. Coded 4 if the respondent has a 4-year degree. Coded 5 if the respondent has a post-graduate education.
Homeowner	A dichotomous variable. Coded one if a respondent is homeowner and zero if the respondent is renting.
Ideology	A categorical variable. Coded 1 if the respondent is vary liberal. Coded 2 if the respondent is somewhat liberal. Coded 3 if the respondent is middle of the road (also the reference category). Coded 4 if the respondent is somewhat conservative. Coded 5 in the respondent is very conservative. Coded 6 is the respondent does not know their political ideology.
Party identification	A nominal variable. Coded 1 if the respondent is a registered Democrat. Coded 2 if the respondent is a registered Republican. Coded 3 if the respondent is registered with a third party. Coded 4 if the respondent is a registered independent (also the reference category). Coded 5 if the respondent is not registered to vote.
Year fixed effects	Fixed effects identifier for year of survey administration. Can take one of five values 2004, 2005, 2008, 2010, 2012.
County fixed effects	Fixed effect identifier of respondent’s county. Can take one of 58 values for each possible county in California. Alpine county is dropped as it predicts failure perfectly (a total of 4 observations in the data).

Table C.2: PP Variable Summary Statistics

Variable	N	(%)	Mean	SD	Median	Min	Max
Dependent Variable							
Support	29779		0.50	0.50	0	0	1
Independent Variables							
Respondent trust	29723		2.86	0.64	3	1	4
Ballot measure substance	30189		1.47	0.67	1	1	3
Decentralizing	25979	62.07					
Mixed Neutral	11870	28.36					
Centralizing	4005	9.57					
Control Variables							
Female	30189		0.50	0.50	0	0	1
Age	29616		53.49	16.75	54	18	99
Age-squared	29616		3142.20	1835.27	2916	324	9801
Family income	27715		3.81	1.88	4	1	7
Under \$20,000	3668	13.23					
\$20,000 to under \$40,000	3668	17.67					
\$40,000 to under \$60,000	4477	16.15					
\$60,000 to under \$80,000	3915	14.13					
\$80,000 to under \$100,000	3401	12.27					
\$100,000 to under \$200,000	5450	19.66					
\$200,000 or more	1908	6.88					
Race	29329		3.55	0.86	4	1	5
Asian	1499	5.11					
Black or African American	1867	6.37					
Hispanic or Latino	5598	19.09					
White	19592	66.80					
Other	733	5.11					
Education	29920		3.40	1.19	3	1	5
Some high school or less	1987	6.64					
High school graduate or GED	5172	17.29					
Some college	7891	26.37					
College graduate	8580	28.68					
Post graduate	6290	21.02					
Homeowner	29919		0.72	0.45	1	0	1
Ideology	30016		3.20	1.36	3	1	8
Very liberal	3240	10.79					
Somewhat liberal	5912	19.70					
Middle of the road	8816	29.37					
Somewhat conservative	7199	23.98					
Very conservative	4304	14.34					
Don't know	545	1.82					
Party identification	28664		2.03	1.24	2	1	6
Democrat	12804	44.67					
Republican	9337	32.57					
Third party	443	1.55					
Independent	5564	19.41					
Not registered	513	1.80					

Table C.3: Ballot Measures in PPIC Surveys

Ballot ID	Ballot Name	Year	Description	Type	Substance
CA1132	Proposition 58	2004	The California Balanced Budget Act. Legislative Constitutional Amendment.	Legislative Referendum	Decentralizing
CA1137	Proposition 76	2005	State Spending and School Funding Limits. Initiative Constitutional Amendment.	Initiative	Neutral
CA1139	Proposition 77	2005	Redistricting. Initiative Constitutional Amendment.	Initiative	Decentralizing
CA1161	Proposition 98	2008	Government Acquisition, Regulation of Private Property. Constitutional Amendment.	Initiative	Decentralizing
CA1166	Proposition 93	2008	Limits on Legislators' Terms in Office. Initiative Constitutional Amendment.	Initiative	Decentralizing
CA1167	Proposition 4	2008	Waiting Period and Parental Notification Before Termination of Minor's Pregnancy. Initiative Constitutional	Initiative	Decentralizing
CA1168	Proposition 11	2008	Redistricting. Initiative Constitutional Amendment and Statute.	Initiative	Decentralizing
CA1169	Proposition 8	2008	Eliminates Right of Same-Sex Couples to Marry. Initiative Constitutional Amendment.	Initiative	Decentralizing
CA1177	Proposition 99	2008	Eminent Domain. Acquisition of Owner-Occupied Residence. Constitutional Amendment.	Initiative	Decentralizing
CA1186	Proposition 23	2010	Suspends Implementation of Air Pollution Control Law (AB 32) Requiring Major Sources of Emissions to	Initiative	Decentralizing
CA1188	Proposition 24	2010	Repeals Recent Legislation that Would Allow Businesses to Lower Their Tax Liability. Initiative Statute.	Initiative	Neutral
CA1191	Proposition 19	2010	Changes California Law to Legalize Marijuana and Allow It to Be Regulated and Taxed.	Initiative	Decentralizing
CA1196	Proposition 25	2010	Changes Legislative Vote Requirement to Pass a Budget from Two-Thirds to a Simple Majority. Retains Tw	Initiative	Centralizing
CA1200	Proposition 38	2012	Tax for Education and Early Childhood Programs. Initiative Statute.	Initiative	Neutral
CA1201	Proposition 31	2012	State Budget. State and Local Government. Initiative Constitutional Amendment and Statute.	Initiative	Neutral
CA1202	Proposition 32	2012	Prohibits Political Contributions by Payroll Deduction. Prohibitions on Contributions to Candidates.	Initiative	Decentralizing
CA1207	Proposition 30	2012	Temporary Taxes to Fund Education. Guaranteed Local Public Safety Funding. Initiative Constitutional	Initiative	Neutral

Table C.4: Table 2 Full Results

	Support for measure b/se
Respondent:	
Trusts government	0.415** (0.063)
Does not trust government	-0.586** (0.085)
Ballot Measure:	
Decentralizing	-0.080 (0.167)
Centralizing:	0.689* (0.286)
Interaction:	
Trusts government x Decentralizing	-0.401** (0.074)
Trusts government x Centralizing	-0.180 (0.137)
Does not trust government x Decentralizing	0.821** (0.101)
Does not trust government x Centralizing	-0.471** (0.145)
Respondent controls:	
Female	-0.105** (0.026)
Age	-0.014** (0.005)
Age squared	0.000* (0.000)
Income:	
\$20,000 to under \$40,000	0.017 (0.049)
\$40,000 to under \$60,000	0.027 (0.052)
\$60,000 to under \$80,000	-0.028 (0.055)
\$80,000 to under \$100,000	0.016 (0.058)
\$100,000 to under \$200,000	0.028 (0.056)
\$200,000 or more	-0.053 (0.070)
Race:	
Asian	-0.036 (0.061)
Black or African American	0.041 (0.056)
Hispanic or Latino	-0.126** (0.041)
Other	-0.017 (0.084)
Education:	
High school graduate	-0.018 (0.065)
Some college	-0.028 (0.065)

College graduate	0.014 (0.066)
Post graduate	-0.064 (0.070)
Homeowner	-0.071* (0.034)
Ideology:	
Very liberal	0.012 (0.048)
Somewhat liberal	0.046 (0.038)
Somewhat conservative	0.149** (0.037)
Very conservative	0.012 (0.045)
Don't know	0.014 (0.118)
Party identification:	
Registered, Democrat	-0.008 (0.038)
Registered, Republican	0.044 (0.041)
Registered, third party	-0.057 (0.114)
Registered, independent	0.000 (.)
Not registered	-0.219* (0.108)
Year fixed effects	✓
County fixed effects	✓
Constant	1.464** (0.323)
σ^2	-3.002** (0.369)
N. of cases	25,129
Number of groups	17
AIC	33991.542
BIC	34780.325

APPENDIX D

COARSENEDED EXACT MATCHING

One potential concern of the analysis presented in the main body of the paper is that trust in politics is not randomly assigned. Scholars have identified a number of socio-economic factors that can influence an individual's trust in government (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995, Gleaser et al. 2000, Paterson 2008). Potential confounders – variables that influence both support for ballot measures and political trust – could introduce bias. While I cannot randomly assign political trust, I can attempt to address potential confounders. Matching is by no means a panacea, but it does allow me to at a minimum balance on several important covariates of interest.

I leverage the *cem* (coarsened exact matching) package in Stata (Blackwell et al. 2009). To achieve a balance between treatment (individuals who trust state government) and control (individuals who do not trust state government). Individuals who only sometimes trust state government are excluded from this analysis. I employ exact matching on the following covariates that I can be plausibly assigned pre-treatment and unrelated to the treatment – whether an individual is trusting of state government. I match on race (white versus non-white), gender (male versus female), education (high school or less, more than high school less than a baccalaureate degree, baccalaureate degree or higher). I also include exact match on a respondent's county of residence and year the survey was administered. Of 13,972 respondents included in the survey, a total of 9,826 are included in the matched data – 6,367 in the treatment group and 3,459 in the control.

After matching on covariates, I regress political trust –interacted with ballot measure centralization – on measure support. I also include a vector of theoretically relevant covariates associated with ballot measure support. Standard errors are clustered by ballot measure. Results are substantively similar to the model presented in the main body of the paper. Table C.1 below reports the model with substantive effects for statistically significant variables. Again, I find evidence of a conditional relationship between trust and support for decentralization. Respondents who are untrusting of state government support ballot measures at lower rates as measures become more centralized. Respondents who trust state government become increasingly supportive of ballot measures as measures become increasingly centralized.

Functionally, the model predicts that when a ballot measure is neutral in centralization – the reference category – a respondent who trust state government is 2.5 percent more likely to support the measure compared to an untrusting individual. The difference is statistically significant. Moving to centralization, individuals who are untrusting of state government are significantly (8.4 percent) more likely to support a decentralizing ballot measure compared to trusting individuals. The coefficient for a centralizing ballot measure is positive but insignificant in the model. Finally, looking at the interactive effects, I find that trusting individuals are significantly (5.8 percent) less likely to support a decentralizing ballot measure. The model reports a positive – yet insignificant – coefficient for the interactive effects of trusting individuals and centralizing ballot measures.

I further evaluate this relationship by reporting marginal effect plots of the interaction term in Figure C.1. Looking first at the marginal effects of trust – I find a significant and positive association with trusting individuals and support for ballot measures. Trusting

individuals are around 8 percent less likely to support decentralizing ballot measures relative to untrusting individuals. This relationship reverses for neutral and centralizing ballot measures – trusting individuals become significantly more likely to support these types of ballot measures relative to untrusting individuals. Functionally, trusting individuals are 22 percent more likely to support a neutral ballot measure than untrusting individuals. Trusting individuals are 34 percent more likely to support a centralizing ballot measure when compared to untrusting individuals.

Turning to the marginal effects of ballot measure substance – I observe a significant and negative association for decentralizing measures across level of trust and a significant and positive association for centralizing measures across levels of trust. Individuals who do not trust state government are 24 percent more likely to support a decentralizing ballot measure than a neutral ballot measure (the reference category). This is significantly greater support than both neutral and centralizing ballot measures. The marginal effect predicts that untrusting individuals are around 3 percent more likely to support a centralizing ballot measure compared to a neutral ballot measure – although this relationship is far from significant. Conversely, trusting individuals are 6 percent less likely to support a decentralizing ballot measure compared to a neutral measure – although the association is not statistically significant. Individuals who trust government are significantly more likely to support a centralizing ballot measure. On average, a centralizing ballot measure has a ten percent greater probability of being supported compared to a neutral ballot measure, amongst trusting individuals.

Table D.1: Support for Ballot Measures – Matching Approach



	Support for measure b/se	Substantive Effects
Respondent:		
Trusts government	0.978* (0.396)	0.025
Ballot Measure:		
Decentralizing	1.068** (0.277)	0.084
Centralizing	0.105 (0.249)	0.049
Interaction:		
Trust government x Decentralizing	-1.305** (0.458)	-0.058
Trusts government x Centralizing	0.392 (0.427)	0.115
Respondent controls:		
Age	-0.003 (0.011)	
Age squared	-0.000 (0.000)	
Income:		
\$20,000 to under \$40,000	0.224+ (0.124)	
\$40,000 to under \$60,000	0.137 (0.118)	
\$60,000 to under \$80,000	0.146 (0.147)	
\$80,000 to under \$100,000	-0.111 (0.132)	
\$100,000 to under \$200,000	0.048 (0.140)	
\$200,000 or more	0.098	

Table D.1: Continued

	Support for measure b/ se	Substantive Effects	Support for measure	Substantive
Homeowner	(0.184) -0.007 (0.058)			
Ideology:				
Very liberal	-0.141 (0.201)			
Somewhat liberal	-0.120 (0.164)			
Somewhat conservative	0.030 (0.089)			
Very conservative	-0.062 (0.185)			
Don't know	-1.184** (0.329)			
Party identification:				
Registered, Democrat	-0.068 (0.116)			
Registered, Republican	-0.058 (0.104)			
Registered, third party	0.186 (0.230)			
Registered, independent	0.000 (.)			
Not registered	0.321 (0.503)			
Constant	-0.519 (0.398)			
N. of cases	6,073			
Number of groups	17			
AIC	7881.727			
BIC	7989.113			

Notes: + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors clustered on ballot measures

Figure D.1: Marginal Effects of Trust \times Substance



Notes: 95% confidence intervals.

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